INTRODUCTION
As has been well documented, skill differentials rose sharply over the 1980s. Current Population Survey (CPS) data show that earnings differentials between high-school and college graduates rose by more than ten percentage points over the decade. Occupational differentials also rose. The Employment Cost index shows that between 1979 and 1989, the earnings differential between operatives on the one hand and managers and professionals on the other rose by ten percentage points, while the differential between laborers and operatives rose by four. While the increase in skill differentials has been well documented (e.g., Welch [1989, 1992] In the research reported here we rely on data drawn from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), the Census of Manufactures and the NBER trade data set to examine possible explanations for skill upgrading within U. S. manufacturing. To date, most work done on the widening of skill differentials has used CPS data. Unlike the CPS, the ASM contains information on outputs and nonlabor inputs. We use information on these inputs and the detailed classification of industries by output to evaluate alternative explanations for skill upgrading.
ASM data reveal a trend increase in the share of nonproduction labor in total employment consistent with the CPS evidence on skill upgrading. This increase accelerated during the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1989 the employment of production workers in U. S. manufacturing dropped by 15 percent from 14.5 to 12.3 million, while nonproduction employment rose 3 percent from 6.5 to 6.7 million. Given the rise in the relative wages of nonproduction workers that occurred over this period, these dramatic shifts in utilization suggest shifts in labor demand within manufacturing away from production and toward nonproduction labor. Perhaps the most plausible explanations for such shifts are increased international competition and production-labor-saving technological change, both of which could be expected to decrease the (domestic) demand for production labor. Other possible explanations are the defense buildup and the severe recession of the early 1980s.
To preview our results, we find that less than one-third of the shift of employment from production to nonproduction workers can be accounted for by "between-industry" shifts, i.e., a reallocation of production away from those manufacturing industries with high shares of production workers in their workforce to those with low shares. We are able to attribute many of these betweenindustry shifts to increased defense procurements and some to increased trade during the 1980s. Most of the shift to nonproduction employment occurred within (as opposed to between) fourdigit manufacturing industries. These within-industry shifts are largely unrelated to imports or to defense procurements. Within our accounting framework we attribute the residual to productionlabor-saving technological change. We find skill upgrading to be positively correlated with investment in computers and to R&D 369 expenditures. These results are consistent with Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) case studies, which report that new technologies have generally displaced production workers. We infer a predominant role for production-labor-saving technological change in explaining the shift of demand toward skilled labor in the 1980s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I documents trends in the composition of manufacturing employment and discusses possible explanations. Section II presents variance decompositions that gauge the potential importance of trade and defense in explaining these trends. In Section III we present evidence from industry regressions on the effect of various technological factors on the demand for nonproduction workers. Section IV reviews other evidence consistent with the emphasis we have put on technological change. Section V concludes the paper.
I. TRENDS WITHIN MANUFACTURING

A. The Move Toward Nonproduction Labor
Much of the work in this paper is based on data drawn from the ASM, which is a survey of manufacturing establishments sampled from those responding to the comprehensive Census of Manufactures (COM). The ASM collects data on total employment, total payroll, production worker employment, production worker hours, the value of shipments, and expenditures on new capital investment, energy, and materials. The information is reported for four-digit SIC industries. Data from the ASM were combined with price deflators to construct measures of the capital stock. 1 The ASM classifies employment in two broad occupational categories: production and nonproduction workers. Production workers are "workers (up through the working foreman level) engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting and other manufacturing." Nonproduction workers are "personnel, including those engaged in supervision (above the working foreman level), installation and servicing of own product, sales, Figure I plots nonproduction employment as a fraction of total employment in manufacturing. The top line represents the fraction of all nonproduction employment in employment, while the bottom line represents the fraction of nonproduction employment in operating establishments. This graph has three striking features. First, the fraction of employment that is nonproduction is countercyclical, since production employment is more cyclically sensitive than nonproduction employment. Second, abstracting from cycles, the fraction of nonproduction employment shows a clear upward 2. In recent years there has been an increase in the use of temporary employees provided by temporary service firms. Such workers are not included as part of the employment totals in the ASM. Thus, the apparent decrease in the employment of production workers in manufacturing might, to some extent, reflect the replacement of regular employees with temporary employees from temporary service firms [Uchitelle 1993 ]. A simple calculation based on information from the National Association of Temporary Services (NATS) reveals that increased use of temporary workers in manufacturing probably accounts for less than 5.2 percent of the increase in the share of nonproduction workers in total employment during the 1979-1987 period. Between 1979 and 1987 employment in the temporary help industry (SIC 7363) grew from 436.4 to 948.4 thousand [Steinberg 1993 ]. Data from NATS show that, as of 1992, roughly 22 percent of all temporary service workers were employed as production workers in manufacturing. These numbers imply that temporary workers as a share of production worker employment rose from about 0.66 percent in 1979 to 1.77 percent in 1987-a rise that was too small to account for more than a trivial fraction of the observed shift away from production labor. The increased fraction of nonproduction labor in employment will likely underrepresent the shift in demand toward skilled labor that occurred during the 1980s for two reasons. First, the increase in the relative wages of nonproduction workers that occurred during the 1980s would induce substitution away from nonproduction labor. Second, to the extent that skill upgrading occurs among either production or nonproduction workers, the increase in the nonproduction fraction will underestimate this shift toward more skilled labor. An alternative measure of the changes in the demand for skilled labor is the change in nonproduction labor's share in the wage bill. As long as the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor is above one, changes in the nonproduction share in the wage bill provide a better measure of the demand shift toward nonproduction labor during the 1980s, understating by less than changes in the employment share. Figure  II replicates Figure I , using the fraction of the wage bill going to nonproduction labor rather than the fraction of employment. It shows the same pattern as that of Figure I which is a trend increase in the nonproduction share of wage bill with a sharp acceleration in the 1980s.
B. The Move Toward Nonproduction Labor as Skill Upgrading
Both conceptually and empirically, the production/nonproduction worker distinction closely mirrors the distinction between blue-and white-collar occupations. Table I compares CPS and ASM  data for the In order to establish how much of skill upgrading is represented by the shift from blue-to white-collar occupations, we constructed skill indexes based on the occupational distribution of the workforce within manufacturing. To calculate these indexes, we regressed the log of hourly earnings on occupational category (as in Fifty-three percent of the occupational upgrading that occurred between 1973 and 1987 is accounted for by shifts from blue-to white-collar occupations. The same calculation using single years of education rather than occupation groups as predictors yields a figure of 27 percent. We conclude that a large part, though not all, of the skill upgrading that occurred in manufacturing during the 1980s can be accounted for by the shift to white-collar or nonproduction labor. This wage metric also shows more skill upgrading among white-collar than among blue-collar workers. By examining the increase in the nonproduction proportion of the wage bill rather than its proportion of employment, we may capture part of the skill upgrading within the nonproduction category as well.
C. Possible Explanations for the Move Away from Production Labor
What can explain the shift away from production labor in the 1980s? Given the increased relative costs of skilled labor during the 1980s, substitution effects should have worked in the opposite direction. Figure III compares employment trends with trends in output, capital, and materials. The graph shows that capital, materials, and output grew at roughly similar rates; while employment, especially of production workers, grew much more slowly. Since, as Figure III shows, aggregate capital intensity as measured by the capital/output ratio did not rise appreciably during this period, it seems unlikely that capital skill complementarity [Griliches 1969 [Griliches , 1970 reveal that multifactor productivity [Gullickson and Harper 1987] in manufacturing rose by 1.6 percent per year between 1979 and 1988, 40 percent faster than in the previous twenty years. Table III shows that R&D expenditures rose, as did expenditures on "high tech" capital such as computers and communication equipment.4 A 1988 Census Bureau survey shows a large fraction of manufacturing establishments using a variety of innovative computer-aided technologies. BLS industry case studies suggest that these new technologies have often involved the loss of semiskilled jobs [Mark 1987 ].
However, there were also other forces at work during the 1980s that could also have worked to shift the composition of the demand for labor within manufacturing. Table III shows the dramatic opening of the American economy over the last twenty years. The United States has typically imported goods that are intensive in less-skilled (production) labor (e.g., apparel) and exported goods that are intensive in skilled (nonproduction) labor (e.g., aircraft), so an increase in trade will tend to decrease the demand for production labor and increase the demand for nonproduction labor. Moreover, U. S. companies are carrying out an increasing amount of production abroad. Even within specific industries this "foreign outsourcing" is likely to have disproportionate effects on less skilled labor for two reasons. First, production but not development can be moved abroad. Second, we might expect the more production-labor-intensive operations to be moved abroad in order to take advantage of low foreign wages for less skilled workers.
Defense Department procurements also rose dramatically during the 1980s, from 2.0 percent of total shipments in manufacturing in 1979 to 4.2 percent in 1987 (Table III) . Defense-related industries tend to employ a disproportionate share of nonproduction workers, particularly with the emphasis put on high tech weapons during the 1980s. Thus, increases in procurements may have shifted manufacturing employment from production to nonproduction workers.
Aggregate time series data will not allow us to evaluate the various possible explanations for the increased share of nonproduction employment in manufacturing. In what follows, we exploit disaggregated data at the four-digit industry level in two ways. In the following section we decompose shifts in the nonproduction share of employment and the wage bill into within-and betweenindustry shifts in order to examine the importance of demand shift explanations. Then, in Section III we examine the causes of changes in the nonproduction shares within four-digit industries by applying regression analysis to cross-sectional variation in the growth of these shares. The same patterns emerge for wage bill shares. Most of the increase in nonproduction labor's share occurs within rather than between four-digit industries, and this trend accelerates in the final period. One difference worth noting is that during the 1979-1987 period, between-industry shifts play a relatively larger role in the wage bill decomposition. This indicates that the between-industry reallocation that did occur was to nonproduction-intensive indus-tries that use relatively highly paid and presumably highly skilled labor.6 In order to investigate the effect of trade and the defense buildup on the shift in demand for skills, we further decompose within-and between-industry terms into "sectors," where the sectors of interest are imports, exports, and defense procurements.
Conceptually, employment in each industry i can be allocated into four sectors: domestic consumption (C), exports (X), imports (M), and defense (D). As in the national accounts, imports replace employment in other sectors so (2) Ei = Ex-EM + ED + Eci
In the calculation below, this allocation is performed by assuming that employment in each industry sector is proportional to its output, for which we have data. The standard within-between industry decomposition of equation (1) We decompose changes in nonproduction workers' share in the total wage bill analogously. We sum 450 industries in each of the four sectors to obtain the four between terms of equation (3) and the four (nonzero) within terms of equation (4). They are reported in Table IV 9. The switch in signs on the import term may seem odd. During the 1980s imports were displacing workers in both production-worker-intensive industries (e.g., apparel) and nonproduction-worker-intensive industries (e.g., electronics). The displacement of workers in the production-worker-intensive industries serves to raise the nonproduction worker share in total employment, while the displacement of workers in the nonproduction-worker-intensive industries works in the opposite direction. The wage bill decompositions put relatively more weight on the more highly paid, nonproduction-worker-intensive industries.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS more rapidly in defense or trade sectors than in the rest of manufacturing, it is hard to believe that either the defense buildup or the increase in imports that occurred during the 1980s can explain the dramatic shift away from production workers. We are not arguing that the defense buildup and the increase in imports played no role in explaining observed shifts in labor utilization in manufacturing. For example, there is evidence that the overseas production of electronic components decreased domestic demand for production workers in some sectors of the electronic industry 
III. CROSS-SECTIONAL COMPARISONS
A. Estimates of the Nonproduction Share Equation
We found in the previous section that skill upgrading within industries accounted for most of the increase in the share of nonproduction labor in employment and wages. To further explore factors that might explain these within-industry changes in the nonproduction labor's share in the wage bill, it is natural to turn to a regression format. It is possible to put much of what we do into a cost function framework. This is a natural approach as it puts the within-industry variation in shares on the left-hand side of a regression which estimates the parameters of a cost function.
We follow Brown and Christensen [1981] in deriving the share equation of a quasi-fixed cost function. Assume that the cost function has a translog form, firms minimize costs in choosing inputs, and returns to scale are constant. We choose to estimate the share equation in the quasi-fixed form, as it allows capital to be treated as a fixed factor and because we have no reliable price deflator for the capital stock. The additional assumption necessary is that the variation in the quantities of the variable labor inputs comes from firms constrained in the short term in their choice of capital levels. We can then derive the following "share" equation [Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1993] where n and p indicate nonproduction and production labor, respectively;j indexes industry; Wn and Wp represent the wages of nonproduction and production workers, respectively; K represents capital; and Yrepresents value added. 1 will be positive or negative according to whether the elasticity of substitution between production and nonproduction labor is below or above one. Capital-skill complimentarily implies that 2 > 0. Po is a measure of the cross-industry average bias in technological change while Po + Ej represents the industry-specific bias. The equation for dSp. is redundant.
Three remarks are worth making about the specification before turning to the results. First, while Y represents value added, in the empirical work we use shipments instead. Our reason for doing so is entirely pragmatic. Good price deflators for materials do not exist at the four-digit level. This makes it impossible to construct reliable real value added measures.10 Second, it is not plausible to treat relative wages as exogenous. In fact, there may be no useful exogenous cross-sectional variation in changes over time in relative wages. While some of the variation may be due to different skill mixes of labor in different industries, some of it probably involves within-industry skill upgrading. In other words, price changes are confounded with quality changes. Furthermore, given the definitional relationship between our dependent variable (changes in the nonproduction workers' share in the wage bill) and the wage measures, estimates will suffer from a version of division bias. However, on the assumption that the price of quality-adjusted production and nonproduction labor does not vary across industries d In (Wn./Wp.) will be a constant. Thus, ignoring relative wages, as we do, will affect the constant term in our equations but nothing else. Third, there is a possible endogeneity bias in the estimation of (5) due to correlation between factors that affect both investment in plant or equipment and unexplained changes in the nonproduc-10. As an alternative, we tried explicitly including materials as a third-variable factor. The estimate of the elasticity of substitution between materials and nonproduction labor was almost exactly the same as that of the elasticity between materials and production labor. The implication of these estimates is that while changes in the price of materials might cause substitution toward or away from labor, such changes will not affect the relative utilization of production and nonproduction labor.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS tion share Ey. Since planning horizons for new investments are presumably a couple of years in length, this endogeneity bias would not be too severe if we were using annual data. While we focus on changes that occur over six to fourteen years, results based on annual data are not qualitatively different from the ones we report.
We weight these regressions by the industry's average share in the total manufacturing payroll over each period.1 Doing so implies that our dependent variable aggregates to the withinindustry changes in the decompositions reported in Table IV . Weighting also serves to reduce noise in the data due to the periodic redrawing of the sample and the migration of firms between industries (see Siegel and Griliches [1992] ). This noise is particularly evident in small industries.12 Table V In Table VI we 12. We have experimented with alternative dependent variables-the change in nonproduction workers' share in total employment and the change in the log of the ratio of nonproduction to production worker employment. Results using these alternative dependent variables are very similar to those reported here. We also experimented with two alternative samples. We tried eliminating the 57 "nec" industries whose fourth digit was a nine. These industries are the ones most likely to have firms migrate into and out of them. Also, to the extent that we match data from other sources with this ASM data set, these matches are often not possible for four-digit nec industries. We also tried eliminating the four-digit computer industry (SIC 3573). The computer industry shows growth in output unmatched by any growth in inputs. One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that input and output deflators have not been correctly matched. In both cases, results for the smaller samples were very similar to the results we report. the fourth and fifth repeat the third and fourth but include output separately. The first column reproduces the familiar result that the change in wage bill share of nonproduction labor is higher in the second than in the first period, and even higher in the third (the acceleration). When the plant and equipment intensity variables are included, they explain about 10 percent of the accelerated move away from nonproduction labor, but when d In (Y) is added, the capital and output variables together explain none of the acceleration. The estimated coefficients suggest capital-skill complimentarity in general and equipment skill complimentarity in particular, but capital accumulation is capable of explaining little of observed skill upgrading.13 Within industries, shifts away from production and toward nonproduction labor not explained by measured factors can be 13. For example, using the coefficients from column (3) in Table VI and the  means from Table V , we calculate that changes in plant and equipment intensity account for 15 percent of the shift in the wage bill share that occurred during the 1979-1987 period. 
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Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) In Table VII we report the result of adding computers as a share of total investments in 1987 to the share equation estimates of Table VI.14 Since the data on R&D are available only at the three-digit SIC level, we have aggregated the wage bill share, capital stock, and computer investment numbers up to the three- 16. Since investment in computers grew rapidly over the 1980s, the share of computers in the capital stock in 1987 will also closely approximate the change in the share over the 1980s.
17. Note that computer investments are associated with declines in production labor employment, rather than increases in nonproduction employment. Using four-digit industries, we regressed the log of production and nonproduction employment on the log of capital intensity, the log of output, and the share of computers in total investments as of 1987. The coefficient on the computer variable was -0.20 (0.18) in the nonproduction worker equation and -0.45 (0.17) in the production worker equation. Thus, computers seem to be substitutes (not complements) for both production and nonproduction labor, but with the larger effect on production labor. annual rate of change in S, by roughly 0.10 percentage points. Using the average R&D intensity reported in the first column of Table VII , we calculate that R&D expenditures accelerated the shift away from production labor by about 0.18 percentage points per year, or just less than 40 percent of the total.18 In column (4) we report the result of including both the computer and R&D measures in the same equation. Both variables pick up significant coefficients, and together they account for 70 percent of the move away from production labor.
These results support the notion that biased technological change has been an important contributor to within-industry skill upgrading. Regardless of the causal interpretation of coefficients in Table VII, 
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(BEA) data available by two-digit industries to examine the impact of investments in high tech capital on the demand for skilled labor. They regress the nonproduction share in total employment on a capital-intensity measure and a measure of the share of high tech capital in total capital. Their estimates imply both capital-skill complementarity and complementarity of high tech capital and skills.
More qualitative information supports the notion that production-labor-saving technological change has played an important role in explaining the decline in production workers' share in wages. Case studies conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics [Mark 1987 ; U. S. Department of Labor 1986, 1982a, 1982b; Alic and Harris 1986] on industries reporting large within-industry skill upgrading, such as aerospace, printing and publishing, electronic and micro-electronics almost uniformly implicate innovations that are production labor saving.19 For example, in printing and publishing "electronic composition (is responsible for) shifting almost all composition and keyboarding to professional and clerical employees, bypassing typesetting employees altogether," and "bundling and handling machines drastically reduce labor requirements.... " In aerospace numerically controlled and computer numerically controlled machines, industrial robots, and flexible manufacturing systems are mentioned as "New production methods (which) are reducing requirements for a wide range of production workers while increasing the demand for highly educated and skilled professional and technological workers."
It is striking how often the BLS case studies written over the past decade mention the introduction of technologies that reduce unit labor requirements for production jobs. What is also striking is that the industries in which BLS finds little evidence of the introduction of such technologies (meat packing, tires and inner tubes, hosiery and bakery products) are industries that show little or no movement away from production workers [U. S. Department of Labor 1979 Labor , 1982a Labor , 1984 Labor , 1986 . In meat packing, for example, an industry in which the fraction of the workforce in production jobs actually increased over the last three decades, the BLS report mentions the "difficulty in developing automated techniques that will accommodate the physical differences in carcasses being processed. industries and even within establishments. Machin found withinindustry and within-establishment changes to be associated with various measures of innovative activity. Furthermore, he finds that, within nonmanual workers, innovations tend to shift employment away from clerical and toward managerial and professional workers. Similarly, within manual workers, innovations are associated with a move away from the unskilled toward the skilled and semiskilled.
V. DISCUSSION
We have argued that biased technological change has been the major cause of skill upgrading in American manufacturing. While both the defense buildup and increased international trade no doubt caused some increase in the share of nonproduction employment, the magnitudes of these effects are not large enough to explain the bulk of observed skill upgrading. That argument implicates technological change by default. Furthermore, the strong correlations that within-industry upgrading has with both 20. Applying Dunne and Schmitz's [1992] reported coefficients on the technology variables (column 1, Table 6 ) to the means they report in Table 3 suggest that advanced technologies can explain at least 38 percent of the increase in nonproduction workers' share in employment in the 1979-1987 period.
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R&D investment and the increase in computer investments provide direct evidence for the importance of biased technological change.
The results we have reported in this paper are restricted to the manufacturing sector. Blue-collar and less educated workers are overrepresented in manufacturing-as of 1987, 23 percent of those with not more than a high-school education, but only 14 percent of those with a college education were employed in manufacturing. Thus, the overall decrease in manufacturing's share in total employment would have decreased demand for less skilled (less educated) labor disproportionately in the economy as a whole even if the proportion of production workers in manufacturing had remained the same. Trade may have played a greater role in this overall decrease in the size of manufacturing than it did in the reallocation of employment within manufacturing.
What our results do imply is that the bulk of skill upgrading that occurred within manufacturing cannot be attributed to trade. This is striking for two reasons. That is, employment is attributed to exports, defense, and domestic civilian consumption, less that portion of employment due to domestic civilian consumption which is employed abroad producing imports. Assuming that employment and nonproduction employment in each sector of an industry are allocated in the same proportions as output in the sector, we use industry-specific data on shipments of import, export, and defense goods to estimate each of the components of equation (2). Specifically, we estimate Ex as E-x (exports-/outputi), EM' as Ej x (importsi/outputi) and ED as E. x (defense output,/outputQ).21 EC is defined as the residual.
Employment shares for each industry in total employment can be expressed as
